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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Case No. 880406-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from judgment and
conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as
amended), following a jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

Following briefing

and oral argument, this Court issued its opinion in State v.
Quintana on October 4, 1989, affirming the convictions.

A copy of

the Court's opinion is attached as Addendum A.
INTRODUCTION
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals.

In Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512

(Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the standard for
granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions . . . .

Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619, 624 (Utah 1913), the
Supreme Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
In accordance with the above-noted principles, this Petition for
Rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.

In

the opinion authored in State v. Quintana, No. 880406-CA (filed
October 4, 1989), this Court misapprehended and misconstrued the law
as it pertains to this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor's comments in his opening statement to the
jury violating the court order denied Mr. Quintana his rights to a
fair trial under both the state and federal constitutions. A
rehearing is warranted in this case because this Court (1) failed to
distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument
misconduct, (2) failed to address the prosecutor's violation of the
court's pretrial order to suppress the identification, and
(3) failed to properly apply the correct legal standard to the facts
of this case. When this Court properly makes the above distinctions
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and analyses, reversal of Mr. Quintana's convictions is warranted.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN HIS OPENING
STATEMENT VIOLATING THE COURT ORDER DENIED
MR. QUINTANA HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Prior to trial in this case, Mr. Quintana filed a motion
to suppress the identification of him by one Calvin Dean Rains. The
trial court granted that motion.
However, during the State's opening statement, the
prosecutor, despite the court order forbidding Mr. Rains to identify
Mr. Quintana as the burglar, informed jurors that Mr. Rains saw
Mr. Quintana come out of the alley behind the burglarized home.
Mr. Quintana immediately moved for a mistrial.

That motion was

denied by the trial court.
Mr. Quintana appealed to this Court claiming that the
prosecutor's remarks denied him his right to a fair trial and
required reversal of his convictions.
The State responded conceding that the prosecutor's
remarks were contrary to the order of the court and were erroneous.
Brief of Respondent at 12. The State urged, however, that the error
was harmless and did not prejudice Mr. Quintana.

Id.

This Court on review also found the prosecutor's opening
statement comments to be highly improper and erroneous misconduct.
Opinion at 6.

Nonetheless, the Court found that the misconduct does

not require reversal.

Opinion at 6-7.

This Court's opinion is ill based.
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The Court has

misapprehended both the law and the facts, misapplied the law to the
facts, and overlooked critical subtleties in the law which require
rehearing and reversal of Mr. Quintanafs convictions.
Specifically, Mr. Quintana suggests that this Court
failed in three critical analyses of this case:

(1) failed to

distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument
misconduct, (2) failed to properly address the prosecutor's
violation of the court's pretrial order, and (3) failed to apply the
correct legal standard to the facts of the case.

Individually and

collectively, these errors require reversal of Mr. Quintana's
convictions.
A. THIS COURT FAILED TO DISTINGUISH OPENING
STATEMENT MISCONDUCT FROM CLOSING ARGUMENT
MISCONDUCT.
This Court relies on State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep.
24 (Utah 1989), and State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), for
its decision.

Both cases, however, are not dispositive of: the case

at bar, although they do reiterate the two-part test for determining
whether a prosecutor's misconduct requires reversal. Nonetheless,
both State v. Thomas and State v. Tillman, like so many other cases
in this jurisdiction (see, e.g., State v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah
1987); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986); State v. Smith,
700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah
1973), involve closing argument misconduct/statements of
prosecutors, not opening statement misconduct.

Moreover, none of

these cases involve the direct violation of court orders as
occurring in the case at bar.
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In his briefs to this Court, Mr. Quintana emphasized the
distinction between opening and closing arguments.

Mr. Quintana

cited federal and state case law to support the violation of his
right to a fair trial.1

See Brief of Appellant at 9-16.

Mr. Quintana espoused the longstanding principle of
jurisprudence that opening statements of prosecutors are confined to
general recitals of what the State expects to prove, without,
however, any reference to evidence which would not be admissible in
trial.

See Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981); State v.

Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941); and State v. Distefano, 262 P. 113
(Utah 1927) .
More specifically, Mr. Quintana identified competent
support that a difference exists between prosecutorial misconduct in
opening statements and those which occur in closing arguments. The
Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259,
1274 (8th Cir. 1985), reasons that prosecutorial misconduct "made
during an opening statement makes it more egregious than a similar
remark would be in a closing argument."

The court further pointed

out the distinction between the two is that improprieties during
closing arguments can be excused as product of provocation while
opening statements take place in a less volatile atmosphere and are

1

Because Mr. Quintana relied on both federal and state
law which analytically rely on federal due process analysis—none of
the cases note reliance on state due process—he believes the
Courtfs footnote no. 2 at page 6 of the opinion is in error.
However, Mr. Quintana also has urged that any harmless error
analysis was improper. See subpoint B, infra. If, however, this
Court disagrees, the federal standard should be evaluated as well.
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presumed to be planned.

Id.

Additionally, Mr. Quintana relied on State v. Troy, 688
P.2d 483 (Utah 1984).

State v. Troy is a rare opinion among the

many prosecutorial misconduct cases in this jurisdiction where
opening statement comments were attacked as prejudicial misconduct.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction in that case,
particularly relying on the opening statement remarks.2
This Court in its opinion failed to address the alleged
distinctions between opening statement and closing argument
misconduct.

Accordingly, rehearing is mandated so that this Court

may correct its error, address the issue, and reverse Mr. Quintana's
convictions.
B. THIS COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.
Perhaps even more disquieting than the error noted above
is that this Court failed to address the question of the
prosecutor's behavior in defiance of the court's pretrial order to
the contrary.
Applying a harmless error analysis to a prosecutor's
direct violation of a court order is contrary to the ends of justice

2

Only one other case, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1253-55 (Utah 1988), discusses alleged opening statement
misconduct. That case involved a discrepancy between the facts
proven and the opening statement proffer. The Court termed the
discrepancy as "so slight that it was not error." Id. at 1254.
Notably, the Lafferty case is readily distinguishable in any event
because it did not involve the violation of a trial court's
suppression order as occurred in the case at bar.
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in this individual case as well as all other future cases.J

In

State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
916 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court explained its refusal to
apply a harmless error analysis under similar circumstances:
The ultimate implication of [the harmless error
analysis] argument is that a state's attorney may
choose deliberately to ignore any trial court
ruling just as long as the state has amassed
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt and
the state's attorney's misconduct relates only to
a portion of that evidence. We decline to place
such a restraint on the ability of this court to
defend the integrity of the judicial system.
Id. at 1007.
The Ubaldi court recognized the remedies and rationales
utilized in other jurisdictions on this issue and proffered the
following:
According to some authorities, the evil of
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately
combatted through contempt sanctions, disciplinary
boards or other means. This court, however, has
long been of the view that it is ultimately
responsible for the enforcement of court rules in
prosecutorial misconduct cases. Upsetting a
criminal conviction is a drastic step, but it is
the only feasible deterrent to flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial
court ruling.
Id. at 1009.

The Ubaldi court then offerred an explanation of why

this Court's opinion in State v. Quintana is incorrect and why it

3 Mr. Quintana does not suggest by advancing this
argument that the facts against him were overwhelming. Mr. Quintana
continues to aver that the State's case against him was less than
compelling and that the prosecutorial misconduct, when analyzed
properly, demanded the mistrial motion be granted. See argument,
subpoint C, infra.

ill serves justice.

That court noted:

We are mindful of the sage admonition that
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the
reality of the adversary system of justice. 'The
deprecatory words we use in our opinions . . . are
purely ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing
such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win
victories, will gladly pay the small price of a
ritualistic verbal spanking. 'The practice [of
verbal criticism without judicial action]—
recalling the bitter tears shed by the walrus as
he ate the oysters—breeds a deplorably cynical
attitude towards the judiciary.' Moreover,
' [deliberate prosecutorial misconduct is
presumably infrequent; to invalidate convictions
in the few cases where this is proved, even on a
fairly low showing of materiality, will have a
relatively small impact on the desired finality of
judgments and will deter conduct undermining the
integrity of the judicial system.'
Id. (citations omitted; brackets by the court).
Cases from the Utah Supreme Court support the view of the
Connecticut Supreme Court.

In State v. wiswelly 639 P.2d 146 (Utah

1981), the prosecutor raised the appellant's failure to testify
after the trial court repeatedly sustained objections to the
admission of such evidence.

After concluding that the prosecutor's

conduct violated the appellant's right to remain silent, the Utah
Supreme Court found reversible error, stating:
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put
the defendant's silence before the jury after his
having been advised of his right to remain silent
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
The references to defendant's silence are
fundamental error, which could have affected the
result and are therefore prejudicial.
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In State v, Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980), a capital
case, the trial court instructed an attorney witness that hearsay on
hearsay evidence would not be permitted in the penalty phase because
of its lack of probative value.

Despite the trial court's ruling,

the prosecutor and his attorney witness did not honor the ruling.
Id. at 270. The Utah Supreme Court noted:
We cannot say that the errors that occurred here
were harmless. An inflammatory obscenity was
inaccurately imputed to the defendant in the
penalty phase, which arose from a violation of the
District Court's order.
Id. at 271. Because the error worked prejudice to the
defendant—was not harmless—the Court reversed the sentence of
death.

Id.
Other jurisdictions concur with the concept that

violation of a court order to avoid prejudicing the case against the
accused requires a reversal of the conviction.

A Texas court has

stated:
When the court has ruled on a point, the same
evidence should not again be offered in the
presence of the jury . . . there is a duty upon
the court to rule decisively. When error creeps
into the record, the court should instruct the
jury to disregard it. The judge must do more. He
must enforce his rulings. Violations of a court's
solemn rulings should "lead to serious
consequences."
Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).

The Washington Supreme Court was even more direct:
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney or
a witness for the state is deliberately trying to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will
assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent
discussions of this subject could, within the near
- 9
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future, serve to prevent the reference to a
defendant as being on parole by all except the
willful or the congenitally ignorant.
State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4 (Wash. 1965).

See also

State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937) (court reversed conviction
because the prosecutor asked a question which at a motion in limine
had been ruled improper by trial court).
The case against Mr. Quintana involved the single issue
of identification; all parties agreed on that point.

The trial

court found that the suggestive identification procedure utilized
with Mr. Rains violated Mr. Quintana's due process rights and ruled
that his identification must be suppressed.

The identification was

suppressed because its introduction, under the circumstances, would
have prejudiced Mr. Quintana.

Neither the State nor this Court took

issue with the trial court's order suppressing the identification.
It becomes difficult to understand how the suppressed identification, when revealed to the jury by the prosecutor during his opening
statement, is now cleansed of prejudice to Mr. Quintana.

Because of

the centrality of the issue of identification to this case and the
violation of the trial court's order, much like the right to remain
silent violation in State v. Wiswell and the hearsay upon hearsay
violation of State v. Brown, the harmless error analysis is
inappropriate.

Mr. Quintana was prejudiced.

His convictions should

be reversed.
C. THIS COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL
STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
This Court opined that because the prosecutor made only
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one illicit identification reference to the defendant—and that
reference was very early in the two-day trial—that the error
somehow becomes benign.

Opinion at 5-6.

The Court further suggests

that compelling evidence otherwise cleansed the prosecutorial
misconduct error.

Both contentions are erroneous.

In State v. Troy, a case heavily relied on by
Mr. Quintana and unaddressed by this Court, the Utah Supreme Court
stated the two-prong test for reversing a prosecutorial misconduct
case as follows:
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a
criminal case is, (1) did the remarks call to the
attention of jurors matters which they would not
be justified in considering in determining their
verdict, (2) and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
688 P.2d at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at
426).

A discussion of prong one of the test is unnecessary as all

parties and even this Court agreed that prong was met.
6.

Opinion at

In State v. Troy, the Utah Supreme Court offerred additional and

very helpful information in analyzing prong two of this two-part
test.

The Court noted:
Step two is more difficult [than step one]
and involves a consideration of the circumstances
of the case as a whole. In making such a
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the
evidence of defendant's guilt.
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial. Likewise in a case with less
compelling proof, this court will more closely
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
- 11 -

interpretations, there is a greater likelihood
that they will be improperly influenced through
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing
and interpreting the evidence. They may be
especially susceptible to influence, and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect
the verdict.
Id, at 486 (emphasis added).
Notably, the phrasing of prong two in State v. Troy is
somewhat different than that recited by this Court from State v,
Thomas,

Nonetheless, the substance of prong two is the same.

Critically important in the court's explanation of prong two in
State v, Troy, however, is that no deference is to be given to the
jury's verdict when analyzing a prosecutorial misconduct statement;
rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more
susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks or, as phrased in
State v, Thomas, the more likely there would be a more favorable
result for the defendant.
The analysis under prong two of State v. Troy is
distinctively different than that applied to a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge.

This Court properly deferred to the jury's

verdict in responding to the insufficient evidence claim because
when conducting that analysis, it is correct to assume the jury
resolved the conflicts in the evidence in accordance with the
verdict.

By examining this Court's treatment of the insufficient

evidence claim, the number of conflicts in the evidence in this case
and their significance is displayed.

This Court repeatedly
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addressed the contradicting evidence by indicating that the jurors
could have adopted the State's suggested inference or could have
believed the State's witness(es) and disbelieved the defense
witness(es).

Opinion at 7-9.

The Court's resolution of the insufficient evidence claim
effectively demonstrates that the evidence against Mr. Quintana was
conflicting and susceptible of differing interpretations.
Accordingly, the Court should have applied State v. Troy's second
prong recognizing that the prosecutor's comments were more than
sufficient to influence jurors on how to resolve the conflicts.
Because the Court failed to recognize the distinction between a
State v. Troy analysis and an insufficiency of evidence claim, it
did not correctly scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct.

After all,

the Troy court expressly noted that na small degree of influence may
be sufficient to affect the verdict."

688 P.2d at 486.

Mr. Quintana avers that the prosecutor's comments were
much more than a small degree of improper influence.

He believes

the error to have been determinative and insists that this court
misapprehended the facts of the case to the contrary.

Particularly

strained in this Court's opinion is the treatment given to the
testimony and identification of Mr. Quintana by Mrs. Rains.
Mr. Quintana especially challenges the Court's assessment that she
supplied the identification evidence buttressed by Mr. Rains'
"permissible testimony" that the man in the alley was the same man
both of them saw on the porch moments earlier.

Opinion at 6.

The Court fails to address that the actual buttressing on

- 13 -

this point comes not from Mr. Rains but from the prosecutor who made
the identification of Mr. Quintana as the culprit against the order
of the court.

Alone, the testimony of Mrs. Rains is uncompelling

and questionable support for maintaining the convictions against
Mr. Quintana.

Even this Court recognized that Patricia Rains was

not very articulate in describing the basis for her recognition of
Mr. Quintana.

Opinion at 7.

While her testimony may not have been

improbable, a reasonable jury would have required more than the
information she provided to convict a man of these crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt.

They had more, the identification by the

prosecutor in defiance of the court order.
Mr. Quintana also complains that the critical information
in Mrs. Rains1 testimony that she had supplied the name Andy or
Andrew Quintana to the police officers during the initial report of
the burglary is wholly unreliable.

Both police officers who

testified where unable to recall a particular first name supplied in
any of the reports or broadcasts.

That fact alone points out the

unlikelihood that jurors would have relied heavily on her
testimony.

As all other evidence in this case was contradicted, the

illicit identification "testimony" by the prosecutor resolved the
issue for the jurors in favor of the convictions.
Even assuming the jurors could have believed all of
Mrs. Rains' testimony regarding Mr. Quintana, that evidence only
placed him on the porch and in the truck.

When Mr. Rains testified,

the jurors made the connection to Mr. Quintana that was supplied to
them during the opening statement by the prosecutor.

- 14 _

Accordingly,

under either version of the second prong of State v. Troy or
State v. Thomas, Mr. Quintana merits rehearing on this issue,
reconsideration of his claims, and reversal of his convictions.
CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Mr. Andrew Quintana, requests that this Court rehear his case and
reverse his convictions.

.

Respectfully submitted this p*^

day of October, 1989

[CHARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Appellant/^e^itioner

CERTIFICATION
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for the Petitioner in this case;

(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this
Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this <^f>>

Attorney for Appellant/Peti/tioner
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,

:ity, Utah 84114, this ^S"
Salt Lake C:

DELIVERED by
of October, 1989.

cday of October, .1989.

this

day

ADDENDUM A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
OPINION
(Not For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.•880406-CA
v.
Andrew R. Quintana,

F i L r -)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Attorneys:

*<b'*:\ c: :r,e Court
G r t sfApjsj!:
t&n
^ C 0Court
*MW:

Lynn R. Brown and Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock. 1
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Andrew R. Quintana appeals from the judgment and
conviction of burglary and theft entered on a jury verdict. We
affirm.
According to the evidence presented at trial, the Ted John
family returned to their Salt Lake County home on Emery Street
from a two-day trip in the early evening of September 27, 1987.
A note on their door informed them that the home had been
burglarized and asked them to contact the police. After,
inventorying their belongings, Ted John reported that a vacuum
cleaner worth $100 and stereo equipment worth $800 were missing.
The vacuum cleaner was 3-4' high and 14-18" across at the base.
The stereo equipment consisted of patch cords and three
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1) (j) (1987).

Yamaha components, including an amplifier and cassette player
(each measuring 14" wide by 6" tall by 10" deep and weighing
10-15 lbs. and 4 lbs., respectively) and a tuner (measuring 14 n
by 3** by 10- and weighing 2 lbs.).
At approximately 11:30 the same morning, Patricia Rains, a
neighbor who lived across the street from the Johns, was
returning from the grocery store. As she turned onto her street,
she noticed a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street
and a man in a tank top and colorful Bermuda shorts looking at
her from the porch of the Johns* home, approximately 30* away.
In the course of unloading her groceries from her car, she saw
the individual knock on the Johns* front door, wait for an
answer, look in the picture window, and open the mailbox lid.
Once inside her apartment, she continued to watch the man through
her front bay window, approximately 85-100* from the Johns* front
porch, along with her husband, Calvin Dean Rains. She saw the
man walk off the porch and over to the burgundy truck.
Calvin Dean Rains testified that, while looking out his
apartment window for his wife on the morning of September 27,
1987, he saw a man in a late-model, dark maroon Mazda or Nissan
pickup truck, with lowered suspension and a broken front grille
on the driver's side, park down the street from the Johns* home
and walk up their driveway. The man was Spanish or Mexican,
approximately 5*6- or 5*7- tall, in his mid-20*s, with black
semi-wavy hair. He wore multicolor Bermuda shorts and a baggy
T-shirt with sleeves and an emblem on one side. The man went
onto the porch, looked in the window, looked in the mailbox,
opened the screen door, and tried the knob on the front door. He
then returned to the truck and backed it down the street and
around the corner out of sight.
A few minutes later, Calvin Dean Rains went to his truck to
return to the grocery store for some forgotten items. He pulled
around the corner and spotted the same maroon pickup truck parked
across from the alley that ran behind the Johns* home.
Suspicious, he did a U-turn and stopped his own truck near the
alleyway and waited a few minutes. From 75 or 80 yards away, he
saw the man who had been on the front porch come out of the
alleyway. When the man saw Rains, he immediately turned around
and began walking in the opposite direction. After taking
several steps, the man again turned around completely and walked
directly to the burgundy Mazda. He looked like he was carrying
something under his shirt because he had a large bulge under the
left side of his baggy shirt that was supported by his arm.
The
man got into the pickup and, after a few moments, drove away past
Rains.
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Rains returned to his home and told his wife that someone
had been robbed. They then went with another neighbor to the
back of the Johns' home, where they found an open window and door
and a screen on the grass. The tall weeds near the four foot
high picket fence that separates the Johns' property from the
alleyway had been trampled down, making it appear that someone
had walked through them and climbed over the fence. They
returned to their home and Patricia Rains called the police,
providing a description of the man and the truck, the name Andy
Quintana, and the license number 5600AK, which Calvin Rains had
remembered and written down on a piece of paper.
A police dispatch was sent out at about noon concerning a
burglary at the John residence. The suspect was described as a
male Hispanic with dark hair, approximately 5'7" and 130 lbs.
The vehicle was described as a maroon Mazda pickup, license
number 5600AK, with chrome trim and damage to the grille area.
The officer who responded to the dispatch did not recall being
given the name of the man seen at the Johns' residence.
When Officer Robert Robinson came on duty that afternoon,
his supervisor told him of the burglary and gave him the vehicle
description, the probable license plate number, and a description
of the suspect as a short, male Hispanic in his twenties, wearing
a shirt and shorts. He was also told that the suspect vehicle
belonged to wthe Quintanas," but he did not recall being given a
first name. At 3:00 that afternoon, Officer Robinson stopped a
truck fitting the description, but with license number 3600AK.
The driver, who identified himself as Andrew R. Quintana, was
wearing a blue pullover shirt and grey Bermuda shorts. Robinson
checked the registration of the pickup and found that it was
registered in the name of Jack N. Quintana, defendant's brother.
The officer stated the reason for the stop. Defendant explained
that he and the truck had been at his home all morning, a few
blocks from where he was stopped, until he went to his sister's
on Shannon Circle at about 2:00 p.m. to help move a washing
machine. As the officer continued his questioning, defendant
altered his story somewhat. When Robinson asked him if the
pickup had been on Emery Street, defendant said that he had a
sister, Irene, who lived on that street, but denied being there
that day. Then he mentioned that he had helped a sister in the
morning. By the end of the conversation with Officer Robinson,
however, defendant had reverted to claiming he was at his own
home all morning and had helped his sister on Shannon Circle in
the afternoon, Robinson decided to impound the pickup and the
patch cords he saw on the passenger's seat of the pickup, and
defendant left on foot.
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Defendant's sister, Gerline, testified that defendant had
come to her home on Shannon Circle on either Saturday, September
27, or Sunday, September 28, at about 1:45 p.m. to help move her
washer and dryer. He was wearing grey shorts and a T-shirt. He
was alone in the the maroon Mazda pickup, which she described as
riding low to the ground. Defendant's mother testified that
defendant lives with her and that she washes his clothing. She
stated that defendant did not have any Bermuda shorts with
multiple colors or any shorts that came down to his knees and no
bulky tank tops or T-shirts with emblems or writing on them.
When she and her husband left their home on September 27 at 10:15
a.m., defendant was asleep; he was, as far as she knew, also
asleep when they returned at about 11:45 a.m. She also verified
that defendant has a sister, Irene, who lives around the corner
from the Johns' residence, but on Illinois Avenue, not Emery
Street.
Jack Quintana testified that he owned the maroon and chrome
Mazda pickup, which rides low in the back and is missing a front
grille, in which defendant was stopped. He identified the patch
cords introduced by the State as his own, explaining that he uses
them to connect a portable amplifier, which was introduced at
trial, to his cassette player in the truck and to his stereo in
his home. He had last seen the patch cords at the bottom of the
truck seat on September 11, 1987, the day he was incarcerated as
a result of a theft conviction that month. Finally, an
investigator testified that the defendant is 5'4-3/4" tall in
sneakers.
I.
At trial, Patricia Rains identified the man she saw on the
Johns' porch as the defendant, asserting that she recognized him
as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him there and that she
recognized the truck he was driving. She stated that she
provided the police with his name when she called them.. When
asked on cross-examination how she knew defendant, she said that
she had never met him, but knew of him, and asserted that he
might have been to her home with her little sister, although she
was not sure. In response to defense counsel's question about
when the last time was that she had seen him prior to seeing him
at the Johns' residence, she confusingly responded, "Two or three
days ago.- When pressed on redirect to explain how she put the
name Andy Quintana on the face she saw on September 27, she
stated that she was familiar with the face because she had seen
him around. She suggested that he had been pointed out to her on
the street and named by her sisters. She claimed that she had
seen him several times before September 27.
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During the investigation of the John burglary, Calvin Dean
Rains was called to the police station to see if he could
identify a suspect in the crime. Defendant was brought into a
room by a police officer and walked past the desk at which Rains
was sitting. Rains identified defendant as the man he had seen
at the Johns residence on September 27. Because of the highly
suggestive nature of this identification process, the trial court
granted defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and issued an
order prohibiting the State from using the testimony of Calvin
Dean Rains to identify Andrew Quintana.
During the course of his opening statement to the jury, the
prosecutor, Ernest Jones, told the jury of the Rainses'
observations of a man on the Johns* porch and that Patricia Rains
had told the police that she knew who the man was, i.e., the
defendant Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor then stated, "Well,
Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant" and went on to decribe
the man's movements on the porch and Mr. Rains's subsequent
actions in getting into his own truck and eventually parking by
the alleyway after seeing the maroon Mazda parked there. The
prosecutor continued: "And he said that the defendant was out of
sight. He didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but
essentially he said he saw him come out."
Defense counsel objected at this point, and a conference was
held at the bench. When Jones continued his opening statement,
he referred to the person seen by Rains coming out of the
alleyway as "the man," not as "the defendant." At the close of
the prosecutor's opening remarks, the jury was excused and
defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting that the State had just
accomplished an identification of the defendant by Mr. Rains
through the prosecutor's statement that it was prohibited by
court order from introducing through Mr. Rains's direct testimony.
On appeal, Quintana contends that the prosecutor's remarks
during opening statement constituted misconduct requiring
reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. The Utah
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a prosecutor's actions
or remarks constitute misconduct meriting reversal if
(1) the actions or remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters they would
not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict and (2) under
the circumstances of the particular case,
the error is substantial and prejudicial
such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there would have been
a more favorable result for the defendant.
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State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (1989); accord State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). 2
There is. no question that the prosecutor's statements
concerning Mr. Rains's observations of defendant, quoted above,
were highly improper in light of the court's pretrial order
prohibiting the State from using any identification testimony
by Mr. Rains. Thus, the first part of the test set forth in
State v. Thomas is satisfied. However, although we do not
condone the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, we conclude
that his remarks did not substantially prejudice defendant
under the circumstances.
The improper remarks to the jury occurred in the first few
minutes of this two-day trial. The prosecutor began his
opening statement by telling the jury that the comments of
attorneys during opening statements are not evidence. When he
reached the point of describing how the Rainses watched a man
on the Johns' front porch, he said that Patricia Rains told the
police she knew the man was Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor
then made the improper, but isolated, remarks about Mr. Rains
seeing the defendant. After defendant's objection and the
conference at the bench, the prosecutor restricted his
references to Hthe man" in describing what Calvin Dean Rains
saw and said. When defense counsel proceeded with his own
opening statement, he again cautioned the jury that what the
attorneys say is not evidence. During his subsequent
testimony, Calvin Dean Rains described only what he observed
and made no attempt to testify that the man he saw at the
Johns' residence was, in fact, defendant. He did give
permissible testimony that the man he saw on the front porch of
the Johns' home was the same man he saw come out of the
alleyway behind their home several minutes later with a large
bulge under his baggy shirt. It was Patricia Rains who
identified defendant for the jury as the man she saw on the
Johns' porch and who testified that she recognized him on the
day of the burglary because his face was familiar to her.
Although these surrounding circumstances and all the
evidence presented at trial do not excuse the prosecutor's
misconduct, they convince us that his remarks did not taint the
2. Defendant does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks
resulted in error amounting to a violation of his federal
constitutional rights. Such errors require reversal unless
they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tuttle.
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (1989).
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proceedings to the extent that, if they had not occurred, there
is any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided
the case differently. See State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 6 (1989).
II.
Quintana next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for the burglary and theft at the Johns*
residence. Specifically, he contends that there is
insufficient evidence to identify him as the person who
committed the crimes or to connect him with any of the property
stolen from the Johns.
In considering such a claim, we view the evidence presented
and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Gardner. 101
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (1989). This court will reverse a jury
conviction only when the evidence, viewed in this light, "'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.1M
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)).
We reject Quintana's attack on Patricia Rains's
identification of him as "inherently unreliable." She saw the
man on the Johns' porch from only 30' away as she turned into
her driveway, and she watched his actions from her driveway for
several minutes. It is insignificant that Patricia Rains
described the man as being just over an inch taller than
defendant is in sneakers. It is equally uncompelling that,
although she described the man as wearing bright, multicolored
Bermuda shorts, defendant was stopped three hours later wearing
grey shorts. He had ample opportunity and reason to change
clothes in the interim. The jury did not have to believe his
mother's testimony that he does not own the type of shorts
described by the Rainses.
In addition to Patricia Rains's in-court identification,
the jury could also consider her testimony that she recognized
the man on the porch as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him
there. She made it clear that she had seen him several times
in her neighborhood before September 27, 1987, and that
defendant had been pointed out to her and named by one of her
sisters. The likelihood of such an occurrence was highlighted
by the testimony of defendant's mother that one of his sisters
lived very near the Rainses. Although Patricia Rains was not
very articulate in describing the basis for her recogition of
defendant that day, her testimony was neither inconclusive nor
improbable.
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There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which
the jury could find that defendant obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the Johns1 property• A vacuum
cleaner, three stereo components, and patch cords were
missing. The three components, if stacked, measured 14M wide
by 10M deep by 15" tall and weighed, at most, 21 lbs. The
witnesses testified about the physical condition of the home
and yard, from which it could be inferred that someone had
broken into the house through the rear window, taken the Johns'
property, left through the back door, walked through the weeds,
and vaulted the picket fence, described by Ted John as being as
tall or a little shorter than the courtroom railing.3 The
man whom Calvin Dean Rains had initially seen on the front
porch, identified as defendant by Rains's wife, emerged from
the alley behind the Johns' home a short time later with a
large bulge under his shirt that could have been the stereo
equipment. He acted suspiciously by changing directions after
seeing Rains watching him and then promptly changing directions
again.
Defendant was later stopped in a truck substantially
matching the Rainses' description, including all but one number
in the license plate, with patch cords on the front seat. Ted
John described these cords as similar to his own, although he
could not positively identify them as his. Even without such a
positive identification of the patch cords by Ted John, and
even if the jury found that the patch cords introduced at trial
belonged to defendant's brother, there was ample evidence from
which the jury could find all the elements of theft as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).
Quintana's other two issues on appeal involve Jury
Instruction 19, given over defendant's timely objections:
Possession of recently stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained,
is ordinarily a circumstance from which

3. Ted John also described a gate in the fence, but the
location of that gate in relation to the Johns' fence or the
alley is unclear. The diagram to which he referred during his
testimony, although introduced by the State at trial, is not in
the record on appeal.
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you may reasonably draw the inference and
find/ in light of the surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence of the
case, that the person in possession knew
the property had been stolen.
Thus if you find from the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was in possession of stolen
property, that such possession was not too
remote in point of time from the theft,
and the defendant made no satisfactory
explanation of such possession, then you
may infer from those facts that the
defendant committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if
you find it justified by the evidence, to
connect the possessor of recently stolen
property with the offense of burglary.
Quintana contends that the trial court erred by giving this
instruction because there is no factual basis in the record to
support it. See State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). He bases this argument on Ted John's failure to
testify that the patch cords taken from the impounded truck
were his patch cords. We believe there is adequate evidence in
the record to support this instruction. In light of Ted John's
identification of the cords as similar to his and the other
testimony regarding the identification of defendant and his
truck at the Johns' residence a few hours before he was
stopped, there was evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that the patch cords seized were, in fact, those
stolen from the Johns. The jury was free to disbelieve Jack
Quintana's testimony that the patch cords in evidence were his.
Finally, defendant asserts that Instruction 19 violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to due process because
it created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the State of
its burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
conclude that this issue is completely meritless. Instruction
19 does not use the -prima facie evidence" language in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), which was held to create an
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption in State v. Chambers.
709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The first paragraph of
Instruction 19 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that
the person who is inexplicably in possession of stolen property
stole that property. Like the instruction held not to be
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constitutionally defective in St;ate v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452
(Utah 1987)/ Instruction 19 simply allowed the jury to infer/
if it found that the defendant was in possession of stolen
property without satisfactory explanation/ that he stole such
property. Such an inference is not constitutionally
impermissible. I£. at 456; State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah
1986).
Affirmed.
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